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Résumé : L’article est consacré au rôle de la délégation polonaise durant le
Congrès de philosophie scientifique en 1935 à Paris. Les Polonais représentent à
Paris une forte tendance sémantique, ce qui – aux yeux de l’organisateur Louis
Rougier – permet de tempérer le concept de la philosophie scientifique par
rapport à la radicalité des philosophes du Cercle de Vienne. La logistique – la
grande disparue de l’historiographie philosophique contemporaine – constitue
le concept clé de l’article. Pour désigner les Viennois, Louis Rougier utilise le
terme d’empirisme logique intégral. À notre tour, nous proposons le terme de
logistique intégrale pour désigner l’école logique de Varsovie.
Abstract: This article deals with the role played by the Polish delegation dur-
ing the 1935 Congress for Scientific Philosophy in Paris. The Poles represented
a strong semantic trend in Paris, something that, in the eyes of organizer Louis
Rougier, gave balance to the concept of scientific philosophy with respect to the
radical nature of the Vienna Circle philosophers. Logistics—lost now almost
without trace from contemporary philosophical historiography—constitutes
the key concept of the article. In referring to the Viennese, Louis Rougier
employed the term full logical empiricism. Taking our cue from him, we
propose that the term full logistics be applied to the Warsaw school of logic.
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Tota methodus consistit in ordine et dispostione eorum ad quae
mentis acies est convertenda, ut aliquam veritatem inveniamus.
[Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii: Regula V ]
Władysław Tatarkiewicz (1886-1980), a disciple of Kazimierz Twardowski
and eminent historian of ideas and aesthetics, used the 5th Cartesian rule
as the motto for his monumental History of Philosophy [Tatarkiewicz 1948-
1950] to remind us that proper method is nothing more than the ordering
and arranging of whatever objects we must focus on in order to arrive at
truths. For a historian of philosophy, this rule is above all a warning against
being taken in unawares by classifications that have the appearance of self-
evidence. Classifications have the capacity to turn aside our attention, just
as an illusionist might. For a historian of philosophy, the 5th Cartesian rule
is a reminder of the importance of chronology, a reminder of the necessity to
return to primary sources and facts when even the slightest doubt arises.
Historical reconstruction of the role played by Polish philosophers at
the Congress for Scientific Philosophy in Paris has shed new light on the
constellation of doctrines that existed in the European academic realm of the
1930s. A mere 80 years has passed since this Congress, and yet, taking a closer
look at the preparations and discussions it involved, we discover a world we
cannot fully understand and thought we had lost all connection with. Why
so? In Central Europe, the war and the ensuing Soviet occupation decimated
human resources. Those who survived were denied the free circulation of ideas
under the regime of the Iron Curtain [Miskiewicz 2014]. Returning to this pre-
war period, we thus encounter notions which, although seemingly universal in
essence, have, surprisingly, been completely eradicated from philosophical use
and even from philosophical dictionaries. One example of these is the notion
of logistics [Lalande 1926].1
1 Scientific philosophy in Europe:
Between Prague and Paris
The general context of the Congress for Scientific Philosophy in Paris, 1935
(15–23 September), was precisely the issue of scientific philosophy. In light of
the situation in Europe in the 1930s, understanding what kind of philosophy
humanity required had become a necessity. Since the progress of science
1. The presentation of this dictionary recalls that this ancient word, which in
the Middle Ages referred to practical calculation, and in Plato practical arithmetic,
was introduced into the Second Congress of Philosophy in Geneva in 1904 by three
participants: Itelson, Lalande, and Couturat “with no prior meeting or discussion”.
They reintroduced this ancient term in order to give a single name to the new logic
of the time (variously referred to up until then as symbolic logic, mathematical logic,
algorithmic logic, or algebra of logic).
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had transformed the world by inspiring new technologies, it was therefore
plausible to imagine that scientific philosophy might now be able to lead
Europeans away from disaster. What would it mean for philosophy to be
scientific? To adapt the mathematical model, as the logical empiricists
proposed? Or perhaps, as Edmund Husserl (originally a mathematician) had
been claiming since the beginning of the 20th century, a radical renovation
of philosophy and science would be possible only through “pure logic” and
transcendental phenomenology. Though while Husserl identified the crisis of
European sciences and was thus moved to reform them, his prodigal pupil,
Heidegger, became the leading German figure calling for widespread rejection
of European science and the renaissance of the German University through
national socialist student action [Heidegger 1934].
The Paris Congress of 1935 was partly the outcome of the International
Conference of Philosophy in Prague (1934), where the determinant discussion
on method in philosophy had taken place. What marked the event most was a
clash between logical empiricism and phenomenology.2 The world of European
philosophy now awaited the continuation, due to take place during the next
International Conference in Paris in 1937, the Descartes Congress. However,
several of the participants—led by Rougier and Reichenbach and convinced
of the supremacy of the mathematical model as a guarantee for philosophical
efficiency and the unity of the sciences—decided during a Vorkongress meeting
held just before the Prague Congress to meet in Paris two years earlier than
planned, in 1935. Just as mathematics is the language of physics and the
exact sciences, so philosophy had to find a language that would guarantee
its own exactness within the new mathematical logic [logistics]. The meeting
in Paris in 1935 was initially planned as a specialized meeting, with one of
the aims being to appoint an international committee for the unification of
symbols in logic. However, the organizers had not anticipated the clamoring
response they received for a meeting of the kind, something which actually
further spurred the ambitions of many, as was expressed by one of the founders
of logistics, Bertrand Russell, in his inaugural speech. He expressed his hope
that the proceedings of the Congress for Scientific Philosophy would contribute
to finding the “cure for the diseases of the modern world” [Actes 1936, I.11].3
Louis Rougier (1889-1982), organizer of the Parisian Congress, in the foreword
to the Proceedings of the Congress, later concluded that the arguments for
logical empiricism, “by their coherence, their sophisticated elaboration, by
the precision of their language, constitute the starting point and basis of all
discussion at the Congress” [Actes 1936, I.4].4
Although the theme of the Parisian Congress was scientific philosophy
in general, the Congress was to become a unique manifesto for logical
2. In the absence of Husserl, the leading role was taken up by a Polish philosopher
who was close to Twardowski and a disciple of Husserl, namely Roman Ingarden.
3. From now on Actes, no de volume, no de page.
4. “[...] par leur cohérence, leur élaboration très poussée, leur langage précis
constituèrent en fait le point de départ et la base des discussions du congrès.”
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empiricism in all its diversity.5 Even though, for some years, the most
active group among the logical empiricists consisted of those gathered around
Moritz Schlick of the Vienna Circle, when Rougier came to classify the
groups and movements in scientific philosophy who were to take part in the
Congress, he omitted the Viennese from a list which cited: French positivism,
the empirico-criticism of Avenarius and Mach, Anglo-Saxon pragmatism,
empirical rationalism (represented especially by French and Italian scholars
and philosophers), the restricted conventionalism of Henri Poincaré, Russell’s
logicism, the formalism of the Göttingen school, and Polish semantics [Actes
1936, I.6]. So why did Rougier not list the Viennese? It would seem he
didn’t acknowledge the latest transformation of the Vienna Circle, occupied
now with reducing scientific philosophy to the syntactic analysis of scientific
language. Referring to Henri Poincaré as a renovator of scientific philosophy
in France (“rénovateur en France de la philosophie scientifique” [Actes 1936,
I.5]), Rougier labels the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle as full
logical empiricism [empirisme intégral]. Because of this qualification, Rougier
points to one of the fundamental topics of discussion at the Congress: the
theoretical role played by the Vienna Circle in logical empiricism as a whole.
Many attendees were aware of the risk of logicism6 within scientific philos-
ophy... Fears of logicist reductionism were plainly expressed in an opening
statement by the Italian Federigo Enriques [Actes 1936, I.12]. As we will now
show, representing the semantic dimension of scientific philosophy, the Poles
present at the Congress played a special role. A role which, moreover, enjoyed
Rougier’s express support.
2 The role of the Polish delegation
Poland was strongly represented at The International Congress for Scientific
Philosophy in Paris in 1935. Attended by 200 participants from 16 countries,
Poles accounted for 15 out of 81 papers delivered. Despite having no
members on the Organizing Committee (Łukasiewicz was only included in the
Provisional Committee formed during the Vorkongress in Prague in 1934),
and despite Poland being in no way involved in sponsoring the Congress,
the chairman for the Polish delegation still delivered one of the seven
inaugural speeches that opened the Congress. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz took
the floor alongside the principal participants from France, Austria, England,
Italy, and the USA.
Three reasons are conceivable for such a special honoring of the Polish
delegation. Firstly, Rougier did not want the Congress to be dominated by
5. Bonnet & Wagner show that logical empiricism has never been homogeneous,
as was suggested by the Viennese [Bonnet & Wagner 2006]. No Polish philosophers
feature in this anthology.
6. See the definition of “logicism” in [Lalande 1926].
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the full logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle. Recalling Polish analytical
philosophy at the very outset of the Congress preemptively broadened the
scope of the discussions, beyond the exclusively syntactic analysis of the
language of science, which was the focus of the radicalized Viennese. This
is especially true given the fact that the Lvov-Warsaw School had already
traversed its own polemics regarding logicism, prompted by the stance of the
young Łukasiewicz during the first years of the 20th century. The second
reason is that the Poles had actively participated in meetings that preceded
the Parisian Congress. Last but not least, there is the fact that, inspired by
Twardowski, the rich scientific and academic philosophy practiced in Poland
had earned itself exceptional prestige in the 1930s. And so it is with this latter
point that we shall begin.
The first half of the 20th century saw a true culmination of philosophical
potential in Poland. In the inter-war period, for the first time, it was no longer
one Polish philosopher among others but rather philosophy as practiced in
Poland which lay at the heart of contemporary philosophical debate [Pouivet
2006]. Polish philosophers, with no anxiety or inhibitions, had not only
deciphered current, pre-existing philosophical problems, but had also often
inspired new ideas. Moreover, in this country, with its over two centuries
of state non-existence and essentially no academic institutions, a unique and
“progressive” philosophical style had been developed at the beginning of the
20th century which took as its references, not the history of philosophical texts,
but rather the scientific ideal of objective truth in the academic context.
Polish philosophy enjoyed such esteem that young American philosophers
touring in Europe visited not only England, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna, but also
Warsaw. This phenomenon even found voice in an article by Ernest Nagel:
Since the re-establishment of Poland, Polish thinkers have pub-
lished many of their important researches in their national
language, about some of which only fugitive hints can be obtained
from summaries in French and German. My visit to Warsaw
and Lvov was therefore a profitable experience for me. [...]
I found Poland to be an interesting and remarkable country
philosophically. [Nagel 1936, 50]
All of this was the work of one man—Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938).
3 Polish philosophy versus philosophy
in Poland
Barry Smith was correct in the initial thesis of his disputatious article,
“Why Polish philosophy does not exist” [Smith 2006]. Analytical philos-
ophy in Poland, in the first half of the 19th century, was in no way a
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national philosophy. One cannot, in any rigorous way, claim that this
is “Polish” philosophy. Philosophy, as developed by Twardowski, stood
independently of the nationality, gender and religion of the people practicing it.
Barry Smith says:
Just as the term “Austrian Philosophy” is a misnomer to the
degree that it suggests that there is a corresponding national
or regional or ethnic philosophy, or a special Austrian way of
doing philosophy that is unavailable to those born (say) outside
the borders of the former Habsburg Empire; and just as the
term “women’s philosophy” is a misnomer to the extent that it
suggests that there is a special way of doing philosophy that is
available only to those of feminine gender, so also the term “Polish
philosophy” is a misnomer—for just the same reasons.
[Smith 2006, 35]
Barry Smith, who makes his own philosophical paradigm very clear,7
stresses the importance of Brentano in the genesis of the philosophical practice
initiated by Twardowski in Lvov. At the same time, though, he does not
sufficiently value either the influence of French philosophers or the role of
experimental psychology, developing rapidly in Poland, both of which created
especially favorable circumstances for the development of the particular kind of
scientific philosophy embodied by Twardowski and his circle in Poland. Most
importantly, Barry Smith seems unaware of Twardowski’s conscious strategy
towards establishing a modern university in Poland, an ambition Barry Smith
nevertheless sees as being of great importance. A university where science and
freedom would be the highest virtues and professionalism the style. We will
return to Twardowski’s ideas for university further on. For now, it is important
to recall that for the Poles, the philosophical explosion at the beginning of the
20th century was preceded and accompanied by remarkable activity in the
domain of scientific psychology, a then emergent discipline.8
4 The Leopolitan philosophical style
Twardowski’s students and followers shared a certain style of philosophical
research based on logical verification and clarity of argumentation, the rejec-
tion of broad synthesis and a philosopher’s sense of moral responsibility. They
7. Barry Smith: philosophy as “a creature of the modern university, it will come to
be marked to an increasing degree by the factor of professionalization, so that respect
for technical competence and for the scientific method and rejection of hagiography
and the use of a mystifactory style will come increasingly to characterize the discipline
of philosophy as a whole” [Smith 2006, 34].
8. The First International Congress of Psychology, attended by 21 nations, was
held in Paris in 1889, at the time of the Exposition Universelle, on the initiative of a
young Pole named Julian Ochorowicz (PhD. student in Wundt in 1874).
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did not exclude the possibility of metaphysical and ontological investigations,
with particular respect to problems posed by modern science (physics and
biology) or art and ethics.9 What they all had in common is a kind of positivist
attitude and a specific philosophical background: anti-psychologism, logistics,
the theory of meaning postulates, and a classical (predicative) definition of
truth—later formulated by Tarski—as a semantic theory of truth.
Among them, only the followers of full logistics10 (Łukasiewicz,
Leśniewski)—echoing Auguste Comte—denied psychology the status of science
[Miskiewicz 2011]. Thus, empirical psychology was successfully promoted and
practiced first in Lvov and Warsaw and then throughout the country, with
a distinction drawn between theoretical psychology and applied psychology
(psychotechniques and applied psychology: education, media, etc.) [cf.
Miskiewicz 2016].
The general heuristic framework was provided by the theory of actions
and products developed by Twardowski in 1911 [cf. Miskiewicz 2017a]. The
starting point of the theory of actions and products (TAP) is the observation
that individuals possess the capacity to distinguish, within their own cognitive
experience, between activities (actions) and the products of these actions. This
cognitive capacity can, ceteris paribus, be compared to another capacity, this
one fundamental to theory of mind (ToM), namely, the capacity to form repre-
sentations of other people’s mental states. The difference is that not possessing
a ToM leads to pathologies of development and communication, whereas not
accounting for the TAP when constructing scientific theories leads to objective
incoherencies and pushes theories into naturalist relativism (psychologism,
anthropologism, cognitivism, etc.). The ToM is a theory of developmental
psychology which has epistemological implications (epistemology in the sense
of a cognitivist theory of knowledge); the TAP is a theory of knowledge with
epistemological implications (in the sense of a theory of science). The ToM is a
generalization based on experiments from cognitive developmental psychology;
the TAP stems from the observation of a linguistic recurrence: all languages
distinguish between activities (to run, to cry, to write, etc.) and their products
(a run, a cry, some writing, etc.).
Action as an effective psychophysical content (to judge that..., to paint
something, to sing something) is a fragment of the flux from a concrete
conscience. Yet, this action may be expressed, a posteriori, through material
signs, as with a written statement on a sheet of paper or a physical object
(graph, recording, etc.). Through expression, some concrete content from a
flux of conscience is detached from its origin and stabilized in a material form.
9. In France, the first colloquium dedicated to this subject took place from the
20th to the 22nd of November 2003 in Nancy: Philosophie et Logique en Pologne
(1918—1939). Contribution à l’histoire de la philosophie du xxe siècle. Since 2004,
a digital site of archives of the Lvov-Warsaw school has been available (http://www.
elv-akt.net/), created and coordinated by W.A. Miskiewicz. It also serves as a
research and digital editing infrastructure.
10. The meaning of this term will be explained below.
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For example, a thought one might have while analyzing a text can thus be
detached and stabilized in order that it not be forgotten. The product of
our concrete psychophysical activity thus attains a certain autonomy with
respect to us and to the fleeting nature of our mental activity. But not only
does this allow us to enter into contact with our own past, it also allows us to
communicate knowledge to others. On condition, it must be added, of properly
mastering the language of expression.
The detached and incarnated products are transborder zones between
cognitive subjects. Perception of the material nature of signs, perception of
the ink stains on paper or paint stains on canvas, become the starting point for
a cognitive process of communication via a concrete process. This individual
psychophysical process leads to the understanding (individual psychic object)
that occurs within the individual who is reading or watching. Material objects
thus co-occupy the inter-individual borders of abstract notions. However, for
Twardowski, the material expression of psychic products that drives triggered
processes does not ultimately decide the success of this transbordering state.
This is especially so with respect to scientific theories. The decisive factor
in scientific domains is the logical and intersubjective dimension of validation
within the collective belonging to a given domain.11
In this sense, the objects of study within, especially, the humanities
and social sciences [Geisteswissenschaften] can be considered as products
(explicitly by Twardowski—artificial artefacts), resulting from a certain type of
individual and collective psychophysical activity, namely, the collective search
for scientific truth. The materially fixed (i.e., primarily in publications and
in archives) abstract notions (“detached notions”) would then constitute the
objects of the humanities.
This heuristic attitude contributed to the success in Poland of philosophy
and theory in the humanities and social sciences prior to the war, and not
only among members of the Twardowski school itself: most Polish academics
before the war shared this basic heuristic attitude, it was in the spirit of the
times. We might mention, for example, Florian Znaniecki, one of the future
founders of the Chicago School of sociology, or Czesław Znamierowski. The
latter was definitely not a student of Twardowski but he was the first to develop
“social ontology” [Znamierowski 1921]—as now developed by Searle. In the
paper he delivered at the Congress, Chwistek, although also not a student of
Twardowski, spoke just like him in stating that letters and logical signs are
“physical” objects “such as stones or birds”. Fleck, again not a disciple of
Twardowski but still a true Leopolitan in spirit, talked about a “collective” in
the same heuristic vein.
Twardowski’s philosophical school undoubtedly constitutes a form of
positivism. Firstly, because it fits naturally into the lineage of positivism
11. The partisans of full logistics (Łukasiewicz and Leśniewski), which will be
elaborated upon below, did not hold this view, instead considering this dimension
to be psychological.
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qua analysis of the sciences (Mach, Helmholtz, Ostwald, Poincaré, Duhem,
Einstein). But it is also positivist in a more general manner, as seen, for
example, in Kotarbiński, who liked to claim that it was difficult for anyone
even slightly reasonable and philosophically minded not to be a positivist.
We should also mention an article by Zygmunt Zawirski (1882-1948),
published in 1935 in Revue de synthèse (published in Paris by H. Berr,
L. Febvre, P. Langevin and A. Rey), entitled: “Les tendances actuelles de
la philosophie polonaise” (“Current Trends in Polish Philosophy”). Zawirski12
wrote about different philosophical trends in Poland, mentioning scientific
philosophy as the most powerful movement, which he described as “revisionist”.
Its intention was to reform traditional philosophy according to the precepts of
logic and, by so doing, to achieve “the ideal of scientific philosophy in a better
way than Western positivism did” [Zawirski 1935, 129]. And Zawirski added:
If we abandon the word “positivism”, it is because we realize that
it is extremely difficult to determine where positive investigation
ends and metaphysics begins. [Zawirski 1935, 130]
5 Vorkongress13 and Congress
in Prague (1934)
The idea of the Congress for Scientific Philosophy was born during discussions
between Rougier and Reichenbach in Berlin in 1932. A couple of days before
the 8th International Congress of Philosophy in Prague, held between the 2nd
and 7th September 1934, a meeting was organized (the so-called Vorkongress),
attended by a few interested parties. In his foreword, Rougier claims that this
was where he suggested that:
The Congrès de Paris, in order to fully merit the status of
“international”, will have to call on representatives from all
those movements that are unified under their shared concern for
broaching problems until now reserved for philosophy, considered
as a discipline apart, through strictly scientific methods. Full
Viennese empiricism, in its latest metamorphosis, limits the
specific task of philosophy to being no more than the logical
analysis of scientific language. [Actes 1936, I.4]
We must keep in mind that the Viennese had already held two conferences
(Prague in 1929 and Königsberg a year later) dedicated to the theme of
the unity of science. Among other things, the Vorkongress constituted the
12. Zygmunt Zawirski was a philosopher of science specializing in questions related
to contemporary physics.
13. The name used by its participants for the meeting that had preceded the
Congress in Prague [cf. Twardowski 1997a, II, 362].
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provisional organizing committee for the meeting in Paris that would follow
in 1935. One of the members of that committee was Łukasiewicz (founder of
the Warsaw school of logic).
Also invited to take part in the Vorkongress was Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz,
who, at the time, was an academic professor in Lvov. We discover from
Twardowski’s Journals of 14th August that Ajdukiewicz was supposed to
deliver a lecture on Polish Positivism and had discussed it with Twardowski
prior to his departure [Twardowski 1997a, II, 356]. The title of the
lecture: “Logistical Anti-Irrationalism in Poland” [Ajdukiewicz 1934]. Anti-
irrationalism later became the label given to Polish analytical philosophy.
The 8th International Congress of Philosophy in Prague, due to the
radicality of the Vienna Circle’s program and their (in equal parts) aggressive
and technical argumentative style, became an arena for confrontation between
logical empiricism and all other philosophical trends. As already mentioned,
the confrontation with Husserl’s phenomenology was especially intense. Since
the publication of Logical Investigations [Husserl 1900], Husserl had been
claiming his phenomenology was both scientific and rigorous. Both movements
claimed to embody philosophical scientificity.
A large French delegation participated in the Congress, among others:
Gaston Bachelard, Léon Brunschvicg, Léon Robin, and even André Lalande.
An interesting witness to the proceedings, with respect to our subject
here, was Józef Maria Bocheński (1902-1995). Bocheński recalls that the only
one not to back down against the formal mathematical and logical attacks of
the Vienna philosophers was Husserl’s disciple Roman Ingarden.14 Ingarden,
himself also a disciple of Twardowski, had an excellent command of the kind of
logical argumentation practiced by the Viennese. In a fierce polemic, Ingarden
refused the assertion from the Vienna Circle that a proposition for which
there is no method of verification (logic or empiric) has no sense. Ingarden
noted that no method existed for verifying this proposition itself and, ergo,
the proposition from the Viennese was itself a nonsense. No doubt, the only
effective answer for this problem would have been the distinction between
language and metalanguage. A work by Tarski which presents this argument
was published just a year later [Tarski 1935] and this is how Tarski himself
became the main feature of the Paris Congress of 1935.
On the 14th September 1934, Twardowski noted in his Diary that
Ajdukiewicz had returned from Prague very pleased, particularly satisfied
with the Vorkongress. It is rather obvious that one of the reasons for
his satisfaction was the prominent place and role assigned to the Polish
delegation by the Parisian organizers. In all likelihood, Rougier, while
observing the proceedings in Prague, realized that the presence of Polish
14. Ingarden provided Husserl with a comprehensive report on those proceedings
and attached his own paper. In a letter from the 7th October 1934, Husserl
replies: “Vielen Dank für Ihre köstliche Sendung. Sie haben den Wiener Positivismus
glänzend, geradezu in klassischer Prägnanz, abgetan” [Husserl 1968, 89].
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philosophers would benefit the implementation of his own project for the
Congress: on the one hand, explicitly rejecting phenomenology (it was
Ajdukiewicz who, during his inaugural speech, listed Husserl—and Bergson
too—as non-scientific philosophers), while, on the other, representing a wholly
less radical relation to logistics than the Vienna Circle.
In his Memoirs [Bocheński 1994], Bocheński says that the Viennese
held the (generally older) disciples of Twardowski in high regard in Prague.
The Vienna Circle was a young group, while Polish “positivism” was
matured, multigenerational, and had already survived confrontation with
its own internal logicist dissidence. Within Twardowski’s school, logicist
dissidence had reared its head in the person of Jan Łukasiewicz (in the
very first generation of his pupils, around the years 1903-1905). It was
Łukasiewicz, having become a professor in the mathematics department of
Warsaw University after the restoration of Poland in 1918, who created
the Varsovian school of logic (Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski, Tarski) and who
set the dominating tone for the Varsovian philosophers’ style. We could
say that, just as the Vienna Circle represents a fundamental movement in
logical empiricism (what Rougier names intégral, “full”), so the mathematical
logic of Warsaw represents the logicist branch of Twardowski’s school. This
is why, in order to distinguish logistics in general from Varsovian logistics
(logistyka—a very radical epistemological doctrine) we use the expression “full
logistics”. Full logistics supports an extremely radical epistemological doctrine.
Łukasiewicz preached a mathematical logical analysis of language as the only
proper method for conducting philosophy, evacuating any other traditional
philosophical issues to the realm of beliefs [Weltanschauung]. Leśniewski was
the most radical defender of this approach.
6 Logicism in Warsaw
The young Twardowski was enthusiastic about the progress of science and
embraced the psychologism of his master, Brentano, with fidelity. Yet his
distinction between the content and object of presentations, which he had
developed for his habilitation (professorial thesis), prepared him for Husserl’s
basic argument against psychologism in the sciences, namely the distinction
between thinking and what is thought. It is crucial to stress that the first
volume of Husserl’s Logical Investigations [Husserl 1900] struck the Leopolitan
philosophers like a thunderbolt. One of the most affected was the young
Łukasiewicz, who immediately set out on an anti-psychologistic crusade. In
May 1904, in Lvov, over two sessions of the Polish Philosophical Society (in
the absence of Twardowski), Łukasiewicz unsuccessfully presented Husserl’s
anti-psychologistic argumentation.
Only in 1907, during the Congress of Naturalists and Doctors, and with
the help of Twardowski, did he succeed. At this point—one could claim—
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the entire Leopolitan philosophical community abandoned psychologism in
logic wholesale. The laws of logic are not laws of psychology, nor are the
laws of logic derivable from the laws of psychology. Logic is neither a part
of psychology nor is it founded upon it. Logic discovers the objective laws
for the interrelation between the truth and falsity of judgments. Psychology
understands judgment as conviction, while logic studies the objective correlates
of judgments. In the wake of the Congress of Naturalists and Doctors in 1907,
this was the new way of progressive thinking in Lvov. What the participants
at the Congress could not know was that between master and pupil, who
together had achieved this reformation, a conflict had also been growing.
Łukasiewicz was convinced that not being psychologist in logic meant being
a formalist. Already in a paper [Łukasiewicz 1906] published a year earlier,
dedicated to the analysis and construction of the notion of cause, Łukasiewicz
disregarded modern post-Cartesian epistemic theory in its entirety, considering
its works to be psychological lucubration. Making “Arceo psychologiam” the
motto of his paper, Łukasiewicz thus declared de facto war on his professor,
who was not only developing psychological studies and research in Lvov,
but also constructing an original theory for theoretical psychology, referring
to Duhem’s theory of science. Finally, and most importantly, Twardowski
was profoundly convinced that theory of knowledge (precursor to logic) was
necessary for philosophy. Even the purest a priori sciences could not exist
without the psychophysical activity of the scientists practicing those sciences.
Twardowski saw psychology, and especially the psychology of thinking, as one
of the philosophical sciences and, paradoxically, one of the very first victims of
psychologism. He was of the opinion that it is impossible to analyze concepts
without even considering judgments. At the same time, Łukasiewicz was
demanding the purely logical analysis of concepts and a return to Aristotle or
even Plato (as taught by Lotze), a return to “Platonism in quotation marks”.
For Łukasiewicz, logic had to replace psychology. This in turn meant that, for
Twardowski, psychologism would be replaced by logicism. And this is what
Twardowski disagreed with [Miskiewicz 2011].
Łukasiewicz fully developed his anti-philosophical stance after his nomina-
tion to the position of professor of mathematics in Warsaw. Logistics became
more for him than just a method or language of scientific philosophy. His
logistics would become a science, an axiomatic system. At the 2nd Polish
Congress of Philosophy in Warsaw in 1927, he presented a kind of manifesto
for the logicist reform of philosophy. According to Łukasiewicz, such a logistics
neither needed nor implied any Weltanschauung or religious tendency. This
is also why it would guarantee freedom in science. Consistently dedicated to
his ideas, Łukasiewicz, otherwise the closest of all Poles to the Vienna Circle,
claimed that even Carnap, who identified only mathematical and protocol
sentences as meaningful, had indubitably committed a speculative excess. But,
also noteworthy, in analyzing names and statements as inscriptions (not as
ideas or flutus voci), full logistics reveals its genesis in Twardowski’s theory of
actions and products.
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It is impossible not to notice an analogy between the emergence of logicism
in Twardowski’s school and the emergence, roughly a quarter of a century later,
of logicism in the positivism of the Vienna Circle. The first to describe it, on
the occasion of the 10th commemoration of Twardowski’s death, was his other
prominent disciple, Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889-1981):
The collapse of psychologism was connected with a fundamental
transformation of the bases of mathematics and logic; a new grasp
of the essence of these sciences reached great depths; they had a
flowering never before experienced. The result of all this was a
phenomenon analogous to the previous psychologism, namely, a
logicism in philosophy, i.e., the conception which attributes to
logic the dominant role in philosophical speculation just as psy-
chologism attributed it to psychology. This was the position of the
Vienna Circle and of its neo-positivistic continuators, undoubtedly
the most prominent and liveliest center of philosophical thought
between the wars. [Czeżowski 1960, 215]
7 The “Polish semantics”
The fact that it was Ajdukiewicz, a Leopolitan professor, and not a Varsovian
professor such as Łukasiewicz, who was appointed leader of the Polish
delegation is very significant. Let us turn to Ajdukiewicz:
Speaking for the Polish contingent, I have the honor of hailing
the Congress and wishing for its works to meet with fruitful
results. Almost all the Polish members of our Congress are
disciples of the school known as the Lvov-Warsaw school. This
school has dedicated itself, since its first years, to studying
philosophy in the light of the scientific method, in the sense that
the character of being scientific can only be attributed to the kind
of intellectual endeavor that goes beyond the individual conscience
in order to become a common good. [...]
Further, we are bound to present only that which we are able to
express in intersubjectively comprehensible words and that which
we are able to establish and justify, vouching for this justification
ourselves. [...] We vouch for a justification when it is accessible to
the control of others who may verify or repeat it. A work of the
intellect incapable of satisfying these two stated demands could
never become ground for collaboration and would have no right
to grant itself the name of science. [Actes 1936, I.19]
In his speech, Ajdukiewicz clearly associates himself with the entirety of
the Twardowski school’s acquired knowledge, meaning the logic and theory of
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sciences in their intersubjective dimension. Thus, not only with the world-
famous achievements in mathematical logic, already referred to by Russell
in his inaugural speech. However Ajdukiewicz claims that the Lvov-Warsaw
School had “found in logistics a language that satisfies scientific criteria”. This
is a rather broad conception of logistics as a language that serves as a tool,
rather than a science in itself, as logistyka [full logistics] was for Łukasiewicz.
This idea expressed by Ajdukiewicz was perfectly compatible with the idea of
scientific philosophy as presented in an introduction by Rougier: la syntaxe et
la sémantique du langage scientifique:
philosophy constitutes what we have proposed to call la syntaxe
et la sémantique du langage scientifique [the syntax and semantics
of the scientific language] since it constitutes the set of rules
that allows for scientific propositions to be formulated and
tautologically transformed in to other, equivalent propositions,
susceptible to be subject to the control of facts, as a result of the
rules of correspondence from our systems of symbols to the real
experiences which they symbolize. [Actes 1936, I.8]
8 Conclusion: The Lvov-Warsaw School
as a logico-semantic school
We have assessed the impact the Polish presence had on the Congress for
Scientific Philosophy in Paris in 1935 from several angles.
From the history of philosophy point of view, we saw that by allocating a
significant place to “Polish semantics”, Louis Rougier, the French organizer
of the Congress, had forewarned of the reduction of the idea of scientific
philosophy to nothing more than the doctrine of the Vienna Circle. Did the
Congress, in turn, have a direct impact on the radicality of the Viennese? This
is a separate issue. We can nevertheless note that Carnap, for example, was
certainly less radical after 1935. Though it may be that it was his emigration
to the USA (in 1935) and, above all, the demands of his new university career
which clipped his radical wings.15
From the history of Polish philosophy point of view, the Paris Congress
found definite resonance in the 3rd Polish Congress of Philosophy, held in
Krakow in 1936. Jan Łukasiewicz was chosen to give the opening plenary
presentation at this congress. In the context of our subject, it is noteworthy
that the focus of Łukasiewicz’s presentation was the heuristic value of mathe-
matical logic in contemporary philosophy, and no longer (as had been the case
in previous years) the propagation of his logistyka (full logistics) [Łukasiewicz
15. Contrary to Tarski, who quite swiftly attained great academic prestige in
California, Carnap struggled to make a name for himself in the USA.
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1936]. Questioned by Ingarden during the discussion, Łukasiewicz seems to
have softened his stance. He stated that his logistics cannot be reduced to
nominalism, that he did not defend a conventionalism, and that it was not
true that he categorically rejected the possibility of attaining to knowledge
via intuition. Ingarden, who criticized full logistics for its radical formalism,
made an allusion to the Viennese by musing that it constituted an obstacle
for the analysis of metaphysical questions. In responding, Łukasiewicz clearly
differentiated himself from the Vienna Circle by highlighting where the two
diverged, as much with respect to his conception of metaphysics as with respect
to his conception of the aprioric sciences. He underlined that, for him, even if
the propositions of logic cannot be absolutely determined through experiment,
they are nevertheless not all equal with respect to their potential experimental
implementation. According to Łukasiewicz, there are relations between logical
propositions and the experiment.
Yet it was not he but rather Ajdukiewicz who—in an excellent presentation
subtitled, “La question de l’idéalisme transcendantal dans l’articulation
sémantique” [Ajdukiewicz 1936a]—showed, in concrete terms, what the logistic
and semantic reform of philosophy might consist in. And, once again, it was
Ingarden who, during the discussion following Ajdukiewicz’s talk, challenged
the fundamentals of such a semantic and logistic philosophy. Ingarden
contested that the theory of knowledge could be defined as a theory of signifi-
cations. (Recall that, for Twardowski’s students, significations are understood
as significations of material signs/expressions, written or articulated words,
and that they are produced as such in individual psychophysical judgments.)
With this challenge, the rupture between Ingarden (who was nonetheless close
to Twardowski and a critical disciple of Husserl) and the Polish analytic school,
as it defined itself in Paris, was set in stone.16 This is an important fact from
the point of view of the history of philosophy, given the growing interest in
the English speaking world in Ingarden’s work.
Finally, studying what was communicated by the Polish contingent at the
Congress for Scientific Philosophy in Paris in 1935 has no small importance
from the point of view of the historiography of the Lvov-Warsaw School itself.
Jan Woleński, one of the School’s principal historians, author of the
monumental Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School [Woleński 1985],
whose publication in 1985 reignited studies into Twardowski’s school around
the world, affirms the existence of two major periods in the School’s history,
namely, the preliminary phase in Lvov and the mature (logical) phase in
Warsaw. The exceptional accomplishments of the Polish logicians in the
20th century are positive testament to this position (mereology, Tarski’s
definition of truth, non-classical logics).
Klemens Szaniawski, a disciple of Ajdukiewicz, stressed in the introduction
to his The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School [Szaniawski 1989],
16. Ingarden later took part in the Descartes Congress in Paris in 1937. On the
7th July 1937 the Reichsministerium denied Husserl the visa needed to participate.
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that it was only after Jan Woleński had published his monography [Woleński
1985] that the expression “Lvov-Warsaw School” came “into general use”.
By studying the Actes of the Paris Congress, we can see, firstly, that
already in 1935 this label was in use. What’s more, it was Twardowski’s
own disciples who presented themselves under this banner in the context
of a grand, international philosophical meeting of minds. Nevertheless, the
fact that Ajdukiewicz didn’t capitalize when writing “Lvov-Warsaw school”
is certainly neither an error nor a printing typo. Twardowski’s disciples
never constituted a group as homogeneous or militant as the Vienna Circle
philosophers. However, as the discussions from the Krakow Congress of 1936
also show, they all shared in the project of overhauling philosophy using
mathematical logic (logistics) by means of a “semantic therapy”. The idea
of a “logical and semantic therapy of philosophy” was formulated during the
Krakow Congress by Zawirski. To illustrate this reform, Zawirski turns both
to Tarski’s theory of truth and to Ajdukiewicz’s scientific vision of the world.
This illustration also encompasses a resonance of the Polish appearance at the
Congress for Scientific Philosophy in Paris.
In turning our attention to the Polish presence in Paris in 1936, we arrive
at the conclusion that, if we had to choose a qualification that characterizes
the Lvov-Warsaw School in its entirety, then it must be the syntagmatic term
“logico-semantic”. Let us thus recall the meaning the two components of this
term carry.
The Polish analytic school is not only “logical” because of the importance
of the achievements of the Polish logicians produced by this milieu, but also
because of the importance that inter-war period Polish analytic philosophy
attributed to logistics. As we saw above, the term “logistics” has practically
disappeared in its philosophical sense today. It is known only to specialists
of Russell and historians of Polish philosophy. In both cases though, it is
not generally given a meaning that corresponds with the almost universal
dimension logistics boasted in the first half of the 20th century (as seen in the
Actes of the Paris Congress). As has been shown, logistics was then held as a
universal tool for the construction and analysis of scientific and philosophical
theories. And, in fact, more still. As we can read in Lalande’s Dictionnaire,
logistics was held up as a potential general instrument of understanding for
“intellectual operations valid for discerning what is true and what is false
and for proving truth”. Thus, for disciples of the school Twardowski had
established, those who took part in the early development of mathematical
logic, to practice the logistic analysis of theories constituted one of their
common objectives. The importance of this tool to the philosophical sciences
was almost universally acknowledged in the conclusions at the Polish Congress
of Philosophy in 1936. Logistics was to vouch for the formal scientific validity of
theories. It was to enable the formal reform of the philosophical disciplines and
scientific theories. It was therefore not out of mere courtesy that Reichenbach,
in the inaugural discourse of the 1935 Congress, hailed Poland as the “country
where logistics has already long played a leading role in the universities” [Actes
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1936, I.18]. It is true that Poland is probably the only country where a manual
of logistics had already been published in 1915, for the use of autodidacts.
[Janiszewski 1915]. And yet, as I have shown above, it is important to insist
on the fact that logistics in Poland cannot be reduced to only the full logistics
of Warsaw and to its anti-philosophical stance.
As regards the semantic dimension of Twardowski’s school, it is determined
by Twardowski’s concept of truth. His treatise “On So-Called Relative Truths”
[Twardowski 1900] begins in a quasi-evangelical manner: “The word ‘truth’
designates a true judgment” [translation by W.A. Miskiewicz & Ch. Stevens].
This definition would determine the semantic dimension of the stance adopted
by Twardowski’s disciples. In On Actions and Products [Twardowski 1997b],
judgment is the product of the action of judging, and this definition, in
turn, sets the general perspective of Twardowski’s semantics in the classical
definition framework of truth. The Aristotelian definition would be taken up
in the scholastic articulation of the famous veritas est adequatio rei et intel-
lectus. Twardowski specified the relation of correspondence propositionally:
a sentence (qua material expression, concrete annunciation) is true if the
things it announces exist in the way it announces them. Such an articulation
of the classical theory of truth contains a host of paradoxes familiar since
Antiquity, beginning with the liar paradox, something which went on to present
a constant challenge for Twardowski’s disciples. Finally, in 1933, Alfred Tarski
introduced into the work he subtitled “On the Concept of Truth in Formalized
Languages” the distinction between language and metalanguage as well as the
limitation of this definition to formalized languages (in a certain manner at
least). This article, in which Tarski denounces the logical error consisting of
speaking of a language in that same language, lays the foundations for con-
temporary logical semantics. Tarski recalled, in Paris, that it was Leśniewski,
in his own words a philosophical apostate, who first took full cognizance of
this confusion17 as far back as 1920. And yet, in Paris in 1935, Tarski began
his presentation with a broader definition of semantics, more fitting with the
epistemic approach of the Twardowski school as a whole. As I recalled earlier,
this definition includes the classical conception of truth, where “true” signifies
“corresponding to reality”.18
The hypothesis that the name of the school, i.e., the Lvov-Warsaw School,
is a reference to periodization implies the evolution of the philosophy initiated
by Twardowski towards the full logistics of Warsaw and implicitly diminishes
the importance of the School’s other achievements. Thus, for example, Tadeusz
17. Lesńiewski was probably the most formalist of all the Poles and, as he put it
himself, an apostate of philosophy.
18. [Tarski 1936, III.1]: “Als [...] [unter] Semantik werden wir die Gesamtheit der
Betrachtungen verstehen, die sich auf diejenigen Begriffe beziehen, in denen—frei
ausgesprochen—gewisse Zusammenhänge zwischen den Ausdrücken einer Sprache
und den durch sie angegebenen Gegenständen und Sachverhalten ihren Ausdruck
finden. Als typische Bespiele der semantischen Begriffe sind die Begriffe des
Bezeichnens, des Erfüllens, des Definierens anzuführen.”
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Czeżowski’s important philosophical activity in Vilna where, among other
things, an original philosophy of law was just about to blossom, finds itself
geographically, so to speak, eliminated (cf. the work of T. Wasilewski published
on the e-LV website http://www.elv-akt.net/ressources/ressources.php?
cat=chercheurs). Such a teleology, envisaging full formalism as a goal,
also excludes from philosophy all the accomplishments of the psychology
of knowledge practiced in Lvov (e.g., by Leopold Blaustein). Yet, as was
announced in Paris, the semantics of the Twardowski school deals with the
relations of language and thought in the light of heuristic activities such as
judging, designating, defining, etc. Something which, by means of a cognitive
psychology of the processes of scientific research and of perception, also opens
the way for cognitive psychology to move towards theory of knowledge.
I would like to finish by recalling that, beyond doctrinal discussions, the
logico-semantic school founded by Twardowski (Twardowszczycy as it was
called in Poland) was above all an extraordinary academic training devoted
to a common ethos of the Dignity of University. The scientific knowledge
evoked by Ajdukiewicz in his inaugural speech at the Congress for Scientific
Philosophy in Paris in 1935 was intersubjectively both comprehensible and
justified, collaborative, verifiable, and reiterable. For the Twardowski School,
the university was its privileged place of production.
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Annexe:
The Polish Delegation in Paris in 1935
I. Philosophie scientifique et empirisme logique
I.3. Physicalisme et critique de la métaphysique
(XV) Grundgedanken des Pansomatismus, par M. Tadeusz Kotarbinski
(XVI) Ueber Universalismus, Reismus, und Anti-Irrationalismus, par
M. Adam Wiegner
(XVII) La lutte contre l’idéalisme, par M. Léon Chwistek
III. Langage et pseudo-problèmes
III.1. Sémantique
(I) Grundlegung der wissenschaflichen Semantik, par M. Alfred Tarski
(II) Syntax, Semantik und Wissenschaftslogik, par Mme Marja Kokoszyńska
IV. Induction et probabilité
IV.2. Probabilité
(VI) Les rapports de la logique polyvalente avec le calcul des probabilités, par
Zygmunt Zawirski
(VIII) La théorie des probabilités est-elle une logique généralisée? Analyse
critique, par Mme Janina Hosiasson
V. Logique et expérience
V.1. Définition et expérience
(I) Die Definition, par M. Ajdukiewicz
V.2. Formalisation de l’expérience
(VII) Mengentheoretische Betrachtungsweise in der Chemie, par M. Eduard
Habermann
(VIII) Logisches zur Relativitaetstheorie, par M. Léon Chwistek
VI. Philosophie des mathématiques
VI.3. Les Antinomies cantoriennes, la logique intuitionniste et le
tiers-exclu
(VII) Recherche sur le système de la logique intuitionniste, par
M. St. Jaskowski
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VII. Logistique (“Logique” dans les Actes [sic!])
VII.1. Syntaxe logique
(I) Über den Begriff der logischen Folgerung, par M. Alfred Tarski
(IV) Sur la simplicité formelle des notions, par M. Adolphe Lindenbaum
VIII. Histoire de la logique et de la philosophie scientifique
VIII.1 Histoire de la Logique
(II) Les bornes de la mathématique grecque et ses fondements spéculatifs, par
M. Jasinowski
